With a secondary supply chain, which consists of two complementary manufacturers and a single retailer, as the research target, a study has been conducted on the joint decision-making of endurance effort and pricing in the supply chain of new energy vehicles. Firstly, a Stackelberg game model is established for the endurance effort and pricing of the new energy vehicle supply chain without shareholding strategies taken into consideration. Secondly, with a shareholding strategy introduced, the model is extended to the situation where new energy vehicle manufacturers hold shares in charging pile manufacturers. Thirdly, a comparison is made between the equilibrium solutions and optimal profits of the two models. Finally, the theoretical results are validated based on numerical analysis. The research results indicate that consumer concerns about battery life are positively correlated with optimal pricing, battery endurance effort level, demand, and profit. The optimal pricing, demand, profits of both manufacturers, and overall supply chain profits all increase with an increase of the degree of product complementarity. Under the shareholding strategy, the optimal demand and profit of new energy vehicle manufacturers and charging pile manufacturers tend to be higher, with the shareholding ratio positively correlated with the optimal profit of supply chain members, while the cost of purchasing shares is directly proportional to the profit of charging pile manufacturers. An establishment of a higher credit calculation coefficient for new energy vehicles by the government can increase the optimal demand for new energy vehicles and charging stations, thus promoting the development of the new energy vehicle industry.