Due to the fact that tourism supply chain serves as an important driving force for the rapid development of regional tourism economy, an analysis has been made of the profit distribution mechanism of centralized and decentralized decision-making in the traditional tourism supply chain coordination mode by constructing a Stackelberg Game Model of the revenue of tourist attractions and tourism companies, with the revenue sharing contract theory introduced to study the optimization of tourism supply chain coordination in the single channel mode of cooperation between a single tourism company and a scenic spot, followed by an application of numerical simulation methods for verification. The results show that under the revenue-sharing mechanism, there is a negative correlation between the wholesale price of scenic spot tickets and the retail price set by tourism companies and the revenue sharing coefficient; in the case of a fixed parameter assignment, there is a unique maximum value for the overall profit of the tourism supply chain under different coordination strategies, with the retail price of tickets and the overall profit of the tourism supply chain increasing with the sensitivity of consumers to the level of promotion and service. In the case of a fixed parameter assignment, the promotional investment level of tourism companies decreases with the increase of revenue sharing level, while the level of service investment of scenic spots increases with the increase of revenue sharing level.