With China’s entry into the stage of high-quality innovation development, the pursuit of an effective and stable innovation development has become the primary issue. Based upon this fact, an evolutionary game model of government and technology-oriented enterprises has thus been constructed to study the strategic choice of the two in technological innovation. Firstly, the local equilibrium point of the model can be obtained by copying the dynamic equation, followed by an analysis of its stability. Then, a numerical simulation is to be carried out of the stable trend of interaction behavior between government and technology-oriented enterprises by using Matlab software. The results show that such factors as the supervision cost of the local governments, the social benefits obtained by supervision, the supervision strength of the superior government on the local governments, the cost of technological innovation of technological enterprises and the amount of punishment by the local governments can affect the decision-making process of both sides of the game. Therefore, it is suggested to speed up the pace of technological innovation of science and technology enterprises so as to promote the overall and high-quality development of society from thefollowing four aspects: enhancement of the supervision ability of local governments, improvement of the punishment system, classification of the degree of regional technological innovation into the performance evaluation index of local governments, encouragement for the technological innovation initiative of scientific and technological enterprises, and acceleration of the innovation development and reduction of the innovation cost.