For frequent economic disputes over big data-enabled price discrimination against existing customers, making strict platform regulations is now high on the agenda. As exemplified by the “Ctrip price discrimination” case, online platform is currently interpreted in legal precedents as service intermediary or online service contracting party, which, however, is not fully matched by its actual operation. Moreover, such a characterization tends to be light on platform’s legal obligations, thus resulting in increasingly widespread big data-enabled price discrimination. The “Ctrip price discrimination” case clearly reflects the fundamental deficiencies of traditional civil litigation against “big data-enabled price discrimination”, such as information asymmetry, difficulty of proof, and low compensation. To effectively regulate “big data-enabled price discrimination”, it is necessary to continuously improve the administrative regulation that primarily focuses on anti-monopoly measures, and to tackle problems including unknown law enforcement authorities and a chaotic mixture of responsibilities, thus making up for the shortcomings of traditional civil litigation.