政府参与下物流企业低碳包装回收的演化博弈与 仿真研究
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国家社会科学 基金资助项目(19BJY082),湖南省社会科学评审委员会课题重点项目(XSP20ZDI014)


Evolutionary Game and Simulation Study on Low-Carbon Packaging Recycling of Logistics Enterprises with Government Participation
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    摘要:

    低碳包装是解决物流包装过程中存在过度浪费的重要手段。运用博弈论的方法建立政府参与下物流企业低碳包装回收与消费者之间的博弈模型,针对不同条件分别求出演化均衡点,并分析政府、物流企业、消费者在何种情况能够达成互利共赢局面。研究结果表明,政府的奖惩金额以及物流企业进行低碳技术研发的成本,是影响博弈双方决策行为的关键因素,据此可为相关部门提供决策参考。

    Abstract:

    Low carbon packaging is the important approach to solving the excessive waste in the process of logistics packaging. The game theory was used to establish the game model of the logistics enterprise low-carbon packaging recycling and consumers, with the government participation. According to different conditions, the evolutionary equilibrium was obtained by analyzing the mutually beneficial and win-win situation between the government, logistics enterprises and customers. The research results showed that the amount of governmental rewards and punishments and the research and development cost of logistics enterprises in low carbon technology were the key factors affecting the decision-making behavior of the game, which could provide reference to related authorities accordingly.

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何燕子,丁志鹏.政府参与下物流企业低碳包装回收的演化博弈与 仿真研究[J].包装学报,2020,12(3):51-59.

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  • 收稿日期:2020-04-08
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  • 在线发布日期: 2020-08-03
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