In view of an inquiry into the mechanism and effectiveness of private enterprises participating deeply in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises for common prosperity promotion, a dynamic evolutionary game model has thus been constructed under government regulation and non-regulation, followed by an analysis of the interactive logic between the equity allocation methods of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises’willingness to participate in mixed ownership reform, with the Malthusian dynamic equation and the stability requirements of the Friedman game system adopted for an investigation of the influencing factors, and with Matlab applied for a numerical simulation verification of evolutionary game process. The research results indicate that in absence of government regulation, whether state-owned enterprises and private enterprises tend to be an ideal non-zero sum game is influenced by such factors as the proportion of shares under the domination of state-owned enterprises, the cost and benefits of reasonable allocation of equity by state-owned enterprises, and the cost of mixed ownership reform for private enterprises. Under the the government regulation, it is easier for state-owned and private enterprises to promote common prosperity, with the government mainly influencing the tendency of stability and equilibrium by improving the business environment, increasing the efficiency of mixed enterprises, and implementing fiscal and taxation policies to achieve fair tax incentives.